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Abstract
In this paper the existence of natural models for a paraconsistent version of naive set theory is
discussed. These stand apart from the previous attempts due to the presence of some non-monotonic
ingredients in the comprehension scheme they fulfill. Particularly, it is proved here that allowing the
equality relation in formulae defining sets, within an extensional universe, compels the use of non-
monotonic operators. By reviewing the preceding attempts, we show how our models can naturally be
obtained as fixed points of some functor acting on a suitable category (stressing the use of fixed-point
arguments in obtaining such alternative semantics).
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1. Introduction
It is known from Russell’s paradox that the first-order axiomatization of the naive set
theory of Cantor and Frege is inconsistent in classical logic. More precisely, some peculiar
sets ‘{x|ϕ}’ provided by specific ϕ-instances of the comprehension scheme, i.e. ‘∀x(x ∈
{x|ϕ} ↔ ϕ)’, lead to triviality if the underlying logic is classical. The most popular of
those is the so-called Russell set, R := ‘{x|x /∈ x}’, for by the law of excluded middle one
immediately gets ‘R ∈ R ∧R /∈ R’, an apparent contradiction. Naive set theory is thus one
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to such a contradiction. Of course not so desperately as it might seem to be.
Although it fortunately appeared that these contradictory sets are by no means es-
sential for the foundations of mathematics, certain logicians have expressed a desire
that such inconsistent objects be handled and studied within suitable theories, namely
para(in)consistent ones. After all, non-well-founded sets (also called hypersets), which
are no more indispensable for the foundations of mathematics, have subsequently found
interesting applications in modeling circular phenomena, notably in computer science.1
There are many examples in mathematics where the introduction of imaginary/ideal
objects, though giving some advantage to deal with them, has also forced us to give up
some basic properties or principles.2 Obviously, the price to be paid here concerns the
logic in which the theory is embedded, and its possible debilitating effects on classical
reasoning and mathematical practice.
For a paraconsistent logician, the motivating consideration is that “minor inconsisten-
cies” should not be allowed to lead, as in classical logic, to irrelevant conclusions. With
regard to set theory, it is hardly arguable that ‘R ∈ R ∧ R /∈ R’ could be considered as a
minor inconsistency on the sole (yet actual) fact that a significant amount of mathematics
can be developed so unwisely within the naive theory of sets. Certainly it would be more
eloquent to exhibit non-trivial models of paraconsistent universes of sets which, at least,
contain the cumulative hierarchy within their classical part.
However expressive such “non-classical” responses to the paradoxes might be, it must
be admitted that in general the techniques used to produce alternative semantics are not
devoid of mathematical interest, especially those involving a fixed-point argument. In order
to illustrate this, we are going to present our models as fixed points of some functor ‘F(·)’
acting on a suitable category.
It has already been shown that models for some non-classical set theories can be
obtained in that way from solutions to reflexive domain equations ‘X  F(X)’. Partic-
ularly, models for non-well-founded sets were so constructed by computer scientists using
techniques of domain theory (see [1,26]). In turn, the most interesting solutions to the
consistency problem for positive comprehension principles, to which in fact the mod-
els we propose are intimately related, were characterized by such reflexive equations as
well. These structures, subsequently called hyperuniverses, are topological models of a
set theory (which strongly contradicts the axiom of foundation) that is based on a general
comprehension scheme restricted to those positive formulae in which the classical negation
does not occur “explicitly”.3 Accordingly, the universal class V := ‘{x|x = x}’ should be
1 For a comprehensive introduction to this topic and its applications, we recommend Barwise and Moss’ book
[8]. The interested reader should also consult Peter Aczel’s book [3].
2 Adding an ‘imaginary’ number i such that i2 = −1 to the reals forces one to sacrifice the ordered field
structure, just as adding non-well-founded sets to ZFC interferes with the formulation of inductive definitions,
etc.
3 For precise references on “positive comprehension”, the reader should consult [17] or [23], where a brief
historical account of the subject is given.
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set theories.4
In positive set theory, beside the universal class V , the complement of Russell’s class,
namely R := ‘{x|x ∈ x}’, is also a set. The next step is to deal with the Russell set itself,
so we make the move in this paper by showing how a weak negation can be incorporated
into positive comprehension.
To handle such a contradictory set, the idea is as simple as it is naive: since, according
to the law of excluded middle, the Russell set does belong and does not belong to itself,
we just take this for granted. Therefore one might intuitively think of a paraconsistent
set as an ordered pair of collections which cover the universe: the first part collecting
those objects which are supposed to belong to it, the second gathering those which are
supposed not to belong to it, and where it is now agreed that these two parts may have a
non-empty intersection. Thus the trick is just to consider membership and non-membership
as somewhat independent but symmetrical positive properties.
The goal of this paper is mainly to illustrate how and to what extent this very simple idea
can be fruitful, showing at the end that there exist natural models for a paraconsistent set
theory. We shall review the techniques involved in the previous attempts so as to trace and
stress the use of fixed-point arguments. Incidentally, we will point out and distinguish two
ways of formalizing set theory, namely abstraction and comprehension. The distinction
especially comes out in the manner in which the corresponding universe of sets is modeled.
We have aimed to make the paper as self-contained as possible, so that it be reasonably
accessible to a wide range of logicians. In any case, this should make the presentation and
the comparison of the diverse approaches easier. As the reader has probably noticed, we
have also included a liberal selection of bibliographical references where he may find more
complete treatments and pursue some particular areas of interest to him.
To end this introduction, let us indicate how such a membership ambiguity can easily
be concocted within a classical context. Consider a universe U which consists of a collec-
tion U of objects together with a topology on it which might materialize some notion of
indiscernibility on U . Then, for any x∈U and S ⊆ U , define{
x ∈U S ↔ x∈S,
x /∈US ↔ x∈U\S,
where (·) is the closure operator on U.5
Note that x∈S → x∈US, as well as x /∈S → x /∈US. Also, x∈UU\S ↔ x /∈US. But now it
is allowed that both x∈US and x /∈US, for some x∈U and S ⊆ U , and therefore some kind
of relative inconsistency may be observed. Note that the non-contradictory subsets of U
are nothing but the clopen subsets in U . It should also be stressed that here ∈U and /∈U
are actually not independent. Anyhow, it is hopeless to define a model for a paraconsistent
set theory in this way, seeing that ∈U and /∈U are subsets of U × P(U), not of U × U .
Nevertheless, we have a situation here in which a paraconsistent set can already be thought
4 By the way, a comprehensive bibliography on set theories with a universal set can be found at the following
address: http://math.boisestate.edu/~holmes/holmes/setbiblio.html.
5 Throughout the paper we use a small ‘∈ ’ to denote and distinguish the membership relation in the metatheory
from the big ‘∈’ in the language of models for some set theory.
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suggestive way of looking at paraconsistent sets, indeed.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we give some basic definitions and specify some notations that will be
used throughout the paper. We also point out a key distinction in the formalization of set
theory: comprehension versus abstraction.
2.1. Structures for a paraconsistent set theory
For any set M , let Pp(M) denote the set of ordered pairs of subsets which cover M , i.e.
Pp(M) := {(X,Y ) | X ∪ Y = M}.
A structureM for a paraconsistent set theory is formally defined by a non-empty set M
together with a function [·]M from M into Pp(M), called the extension function, which
applies any a∈M simultaneously to its positive extension [a]+M and its negative extension
[a]−M, i.e.
M :≡ 〈M ; [·]M〉, where [·]M :M →Pp(M),
[·]M =
([·]+M, [·]−M).
Note that this conception of a paraconsistent set leads naturally to a related notion of
(strong) extensionality which is the following:
for any a, b in M, [a]+M = [b]+M and [a]−M = [b]−M implies a = b.6
In other words, such a structure M is said to be strongly extensional when the extension
function [·]M is injective; then M can be identified with a subset of Pp(M), namely the
range of [·]M.
Now, by setting{
a∈Mb iff a∈ [b]+M
a /∈Mb iff a∈ [b]−M
for any a, b∈M,
such a structureM is equally defined by means of two binary relations on M :
M :≡ 〈M ; ∈M, /∈M〉 where ∈M ∪ /∈M = M ×M.
This latter view is adopted in [22]7 and [24]. Basically, ∈M and /∈M can be considered as
weak negation of each other, since for some a∈M , [a]+M∩ [a]−M is possibly non-empty.
Accordingly, ‘x ∈ y’ can be interpreted as being both ‘true’ and ‘false’ for some x, y
in M . To formalize this, we define the truth function εM of the membership relation ‘∈’
6 Here ‘=’ is the meta-theoretic identity; the interpretation of the equality relation within a structure is dis-
cussed in Section 4.
7 Where ∈M and /∈M are rather denoted by ∈+ and ∈− , respectively.M M
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t∈ εM(a, b) iff a∈Mb
f∈ εM(a, b) iff a /∈Mb
for any a, b∈M.
In this way, εM(a, b) takes exactly one of the following truth degrees:
0 := {f}, 1 := {t} or i := {t,f}.
The set of these truth degrees will be denoted by T := {0, i,1}, and in these terms, a struc-
ture for a paraconsistent set theory appears as
M :≡ 〈M ; εM〉 where εM :M ×M → T
or equivalently, by defining the extension function [·]M in this setting, as
M :≡ 〈M ; [·]M〉 where [·]M :M → T M,
y → (x → εM(x, y)).
Again, such a structure is said to be strongly extensional exactly when the extension func-
tion [·]M thus defined is injective, so that M can be identified with the range of [·]M,
which is here a subset of T M .
To sum up, a paraconsistent set can be seen, on the one hand, as an ordered pair of
subsets which cover the universe, that is an element of Pp(M), and on the other hand, as
a function on the universe which takes values in T , that is an element of T M . It will be
convenient in the sequel to be able to exchange one view for the other. So, without any
abuse, we shall write:{
[x]+M = [x]−1M {1, i},
[x]−M = [x]−1M {0, i}.
Remark 1. We could not end this description without mentioning the “dual” route of
the alternative to Russell’s paradox: the paracomplete or partial case, where a set is
rather materialized by an ordered pair of disjoint parts of the universe. Of course, any
(strongly extensional) paraconsistent structureM naturally gives rise to a (strongly exten-
sional) paracomplete structure M∗ on the same universe M , and vice versa, by way of
(·)∗ : (A,B) → (M\B,M\A).
In other terms:
{
a∈M∗b iff not(a /∈Mb)
a /∈M∗b iff not(a∈Mb) for any a, b
∈M.
Note that in the three-valued setting, the difference is not even perceptible unless the mean-
ing of i is specified, namely i := { } (neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’) for the paracomplete case,
instead of i := {t,f} (both ‘true’ and ‘false’) for the paracomplete one. We shall further
discuss this apparent duality in Section 3.8
8 More on the duality between the paraconsistent and the paracomplete cases (and especially the natural dual-
ity between closed set and open set logics) can be found for instance in Mortensen’s book [27].
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So far, only the truth degree of the atomic formula ‘x ∈ y’ in a given structure M
has been defined, namely |a ∈ b|M := εM(a, b), for any a, b in M . More generally, the
truth degree of any formula ϕ interpreted within a given structure M is denoted by |ϕ|M.
Incidentally, whenever we write |ϕ|M, it is always assumed that an assignation has been
given to the possible free variables of ϕ into M so that the truth degree of ϕ inM is actually
computable. As usual the computation goes inductively as soon as the truth functions of
the logical connectives and quantifiers involved are defined. Section 3 is intended to give
precise definitions of these, here we just content ourselves with specifying some general
notations regarding the language of set theory.
In the sequel, L informally stands for the first-order language of set theory with ‘∈’
as unique primitive relational symbol and with all the logical symbols available. When
we want to stress the use of further primitive symbols or specify the logical symbols that
are allowed in the formulae, we shall put them between ‘〈· · ·〉’ and write L〈· · ·〉 to de-
note the corresponding language. Hopefully the context should make this convention clear.
Now, relatively to any given structureM, LM〈· · ·〉 will be designating the language L〈· · ·〉
extended by constants naming the elements of M . This is nothing but the usual labor-
saving device that will allow us to handle valuations conveniently. Incidentally, for any
ϕ∈LM〈· · ·〉, ϕ(x¯) is equally used for denoting the formula ϕ provided its free variables are
among x¯ := x1, . . . , xn, and then, if τ¯ := τ1, . . . , τn is any list of terms (e.g., variables, con-
stants), ϕ(x¯|τ¯ ), or most often ϕ(τ¯ ) when no confusion seems possible, will designate the
formula obtained from ϕ by substituting τi for each free occurrence of xi in ϕ. In order to
handle substitutions freely, we shall also conveniently assume that the terms and formulae
of the language have been coded in the metatheory, in such a way as to identify the terms or
formulae whose writings differ only in the name of their bound variables. For instance, this
can be achieved by using Bourbaki’s squares in the definition of the language and consider
terms and formulae as formal sequences of symbols in the metatheory. This is implicit in
the definition of the so-called term models in Section 5.
2.3. Comprehension and abstraction
We shall say that a structure as defined in Section 2.1 is a model for some set theory if
it fulfills some fragment of the comprehension scheme, in the following sense:
Definition 2. Let Σ ⊆ L be any given fragment of the language of set theory. We say that
M fulfills Comp[Σ] if for each formula ϕ(x, y¯) in Σ , and for any list of parameters p¯ in
M , there exists b in M such that, for any a in M , |a ∈ b|M = |ϕ(a, p¯)|M.
Such a ‘b’ is usually denoted, at least in the metatheory, by the set abstract
‘{x | ϕ(x, p¯)}’, as it clearly depends on ϕ and the list of parameters p¯. But it should
be stressed that such a ‘b’ is not necessarily unique, unless extensionality is required.
However, whether or not extensionality holds, one may also consider such a denota-
tional devise in the language of set theory itself by making use of an abstraction operator
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ables occurring free in set abstracts. A typical example of a term of the extended language
L〈{· |−}〉 is ‘{x | {t | x ∈ x} ∈ x}’.
This subtle yet important distinction has been rarely emphasized in the literature, so that
we shall rather speak of abstraction scheme instead of comprehension to emphasize that
set abstracts may already appear as terms in the formula ϕ involved in the corresponding
instance of that scheme, i.e.:
Definition 3. Let Σ ⊆ L〈{· |−}〉 be any given fragment of the language of set theory with
an abstraction operator. We say that M fulfills Abst[Σ] if for each formula ϕ(x, y¯) in Σ ,
for any list of parameters p¯ in M , and for any a in M , we have |a ∈ {x | ϕ(x, p¯)}|M =
|ϕ(a, p¯)|M.
Of course it is tacitly assumed here that a suitable interpretation of the abstraction opera-
tor has been defined in M . Specifically, the so-called term models described in Section 5.2
will provide us with typical examples of such structures. There we will discuss exten-
sionality together with the use of set abstracts in the object-language; then the difference
between comprehension and abstraction should be clear in view of the results we are going
to present.
Finally, it is worth noting that both the comprehension and abstraction schemes can be
restated as follows: for each formula ϕ(x, y¯) in Σ , for any list of parameters p¯ in M , the
function x → |ϕ(x, p¯)|M belongs to the range of [·]M. According to Cantor’s theorem, the
range of [·]M can never be equal to T M , so that our investigations might be summarized
by the following simple question:
what can the range of [·]M be?
In a sense, this paper is devoted to showing how, by providing T (and M) with some
suitable structure, a satisfactory response to this question can be found.
3. The inner logic(s)
The three-valued interpretation described in Section 2.1 leads to revisit the classical
meaning of the usual logical operators in that context. It turns out that the deliberate inde-
pendence of the interpretations in any structure of ϕ and ¬ϕ, for any atomic formula ϕ,
will result in the loss of expressiveness in the system.
As we shall see, this can be offset to some extent by introducing new connectives and
thus, depending on the choice of the primitive ones (and on the definition of the conse-
quence relation), a variety of three-valued logics, each having a corresponding variety of
merits and defects, comes up. Roughly, it might be said that all the difference lies in the
choice of the connective taken as official implication. We are not going to specify the prim-
itive connectives here, so that we will not have to refer officially to some logic(s) known
in the literature. In any case, a truth-functional characterization of the logical connectives
will be largely enough for our investigations.
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In formal logic, the choice of an appropriate definition of the consequence relation is
often guided by a suitable proof-theoretic characterization of the properties of the primi-
tives connectives. For such considerations, the reader is referred to [7]. Here we opted for
the common semantical definition.
We first specify the satisfaction relation ‘|=’ connected with our interpretation:
for any structureM and any ϕ in LM 〈· · ·〉, M |= ϕ :iff t∈|ϕ|M.
Now, for any Σ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L〈· · ·〉, define
Σ t ϕ :iff for any M̂ such that M̂ |= ψ, for any ψ∈Σ, we have M̂ |= ϕ,
where M̂ is denoting a valuation, i.e. a structure M together with a specific assignation
in M of the variables occurring free in the formulae of Σ ∪ {ϕ}. Thus defined, this conse-
quence relation expresses nothing but the persistence of ‘true’ through valuations. Note
that in classical logic, the transmission of truth is obviously equivalent to the transmission
of non-falsity. This is not the case here, so that ‘t’ actually says nothing about this latter.
We will see below how this lack of symmetry interferes with the properties of some con-
nectives in the object language. By the way, it should be said that other semantical variants
for the definition of the consequence relation are possible (see [7]).
3.2. Monotonic connectives
From now on we strongly recommend the non-initiate reader to read and understand
“t∈|ϕ|M” as “ϕ is true in M” and “f∈|ϕ|M” as “ϕ is false in M”. Thereby, a pleasant
and natural way of introducing the truth functions of the basic connectives and quantifiers is
simply to translate the classical rules characterizing them. To distinguish the new logical
operators so obtained from their corresponding metatheoretical ones, these latter will be
expressed in English.
The truth functions of ‘¬’, ‘∧’ and ‘∀’ are thus defined by the following rules:
t∈|¬ϕ|M iff f∈|ϕ|M,
f∈|¬ϕ|M iff t∈|ϕ|M;
t∈|ϕ ∧ψ |M iff t∈|ϕ|M and t∈|ψ |M,
f∈|ϕ ∧ψ |M iff f∈|ϕ|M or f∈|ψ |M;
t∈|∀xϕ|M iff for any a∈M , t∈|ϕ(x|a)|M,
f∈|∀xϕ|M iff there exists a in M such that f∈|ϕ(x|a)|M.
Those of ‘∨’ and ‘∃’ are obtained in the same way and so remain classically definable
from these above. This also yields the following tables for the truth functions of the basic
connectives, where ‘⊃’ stands for the material conditional defined by ‘¬ϕ ∨ψ ’, and ‘ ⊂⊃ ’
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¬
1 0
i i
0 1
∧ 1 i 0
1 1 i 0
i i i 0
0 0 0 0
∨ 1 i 0
1 1 1 1
i 1 i i
0 1 i 0
⊃ 1 i 0
1 1 i 0
i 1 i i
0 1 1 1
⊂⊃ 1 i 0
1 1 i 0
i i i i
0 0 i 1
‘Monotonic connectives.’
It is well known that these truth tables correspond to those of Kleene’s strong logical con-
nectives, where then the middle degree i is rather interpreted as a truth value gap, i.e.
i := { }, instead of a truth value glut, i := {t,f}. As a characteristic feature i can thus be
thought of in both cases as an imaginary truth value satisfying ¬ i = i. In the paraconsis-
tent case, we have |ϕ|M = i iff M |= ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ, namely ϕ is contradictory in M, while in
the paracomplete case, we have |ϕ|M = i iff M |= ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, namely ϕ is undetermined in
M. Note that in both cases, the set of truth degrees T = {0, i,1} is naturally ordered by
the inclusion relation.10 These orderings, which are obviously dual of each other, will be
referred to in this paper as the information ordering I and the knowledge ordering K ,
so that in the first case i might be considered as the token of a clash of information, and
in the second case as the one of a lack of knowledge. The ordered sets thus defined are
denoted respectively by Λ and V :
Λ := 〈T ;I 〉 ≡

i
/ \
0 1
and V := 〈T ;K 〉 ≡

0 1
\ /
i
With regard to the consequence relation defined in Section 3.1, a singular departure is
that i is a designated11 value in the paraconsistent case (since t∈ i) whereas it is not in
the paracomplete one. Therefrom it is readily shown that, with the sole connectives de-
fined hitherto, there are no paracomplete tautologies at all, while it can be proved that
the paraconsistent tautologies are still exactly the classical ones (see [28] or [7]). Another
manifestation of that “asymmetry”, in connection with set theory, is the following.
It is proved in [29] that there exist non-trivial paraconsistent models of a full compre-
hension scheme, namely: there exists M, with M |= ψ for some ψ , such that for any
ϕ(x, z¯)∈L〈∈;¬,∧,∀〉, M |= ∀ z¯∃y∀x(x ∈ y ⊂⊃ ϕ(x, z¯)). Particularly, in such a model we
should have |R ∈ R ⊂⊃ R /∈ R|M = i, for it is readily seen from the ‘ ⊂⊃ ’ table that this can
never be equal to 1, which incidentally shows that on the other hand the above scheme can-
not be satisfied by any paracomplete structure. By no means should this be interpreted as
a defect of the paracomplete interpretation in comparison with the paraconsistent one, be-
cause the comprehension scheme as formulated here above does not express (in both cases
actually) what it is intended to; in particular it does not fit in with our definition of compre-
hension given in Section 2.3, seeing that t∈|ϕ ⊂⊃ ψ |M does not imply that |ϕ|M = |ψ |M.
9 Note that we are using the same notation for the connectives and their truth functions.
10 If need were, we would remind the reader that the truth degrees are subsets of {t,f}.
11 In any many-valued setting, a truth-value/degree v is said to be designated if the satisfaction relation ‘|=’ is
defined in such a way thatM |= ϕ holds whenever |ϕ|M = v.
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this connective is not in any sense an implication for it is easily shown that modus ponens
fails, namely {ϕ,ϕ ⊃ ψ} t ψ . Though this holds for the paracomplete interpretation, ‘⊃’
cannot be considered either as an implication since then t ϕ ⊃ ϕ. In the paraconsistent
case, it is however worthy of note that ψ is actually derivable from ϕ and ϕ ⊃ ψ as long as
ϕ is non-contradictory. But the problem is, precisely, that such a logic is unable to express
that one of its formulae is non-contradictory/determined. For if it was possible to define
an unary connective, say ‘◦’, such thatM |= ◦ϕ iff |ϕ|M = i, we should have ◦ i = 0 and
◦0 = 1 or i, and so, in any case, ◦ i K ◦0. Now it suffices to observe that all the connec-
tives considered so far (and so anyone definable from these) are monotonic with respect to
the knowledge/information ordering.12 The quantifiers ‘∀’ and ‘∃’ thought of as general-
ized conjunction and disjunction are easily seen to be monotonic as well. By the way, it
will be convenient in the sequel to consider any truth value 0, 1, i as a propositional con-
stant with the corresponding constant truth function, so that these are obviously monotonic
too. However, none of these is definable from ‘¬’ and ‘∧’ alone. But note that in any set
theoretical framework, i can be materialized by ‘R ∈ R’.
This limitative yet remarkable property has been largely explored in the literature and
might be considered as a kind of safety property13 with regard to the semantical and logical
paradoxes. This will be illustrated and further discussed in Section 5. By way of appetizer,
let us just state here that monotonicity is actually a guarantee for the existence of a fixed
value of a truth function on V .14
Now the issue we have to face is how to define in a natural way new logical connectives
that will increase the expressive power of the logic.
3.3. Non-monotonic connectives
Though the introduction of non-monotonic connectives can be carried out concurrently,
we shall only focus on the paraconsistent case here. The point is that some significant
differences in the truth tables of the corresponding connectives will follow from the
schizophrenic interpretation of i, i.e. i = {} or i = {t,f} (whereas there is no difference
at all in the tables as far as only monotonic connectives are considered). Again this can be
explained by the fact that i is designated in one case and not in the other.
The need of a “true” implication connective is apparent from Section 3.2. A natural way
of introducing such a one ‘→’ is as follows:
t∈|ϕ → ψ |M iff t∈|ϕ|M implies t∈|ψ |M,
f∈|ϕ → ψ |M iff t∈|ϕ|M and f∈|ψ |M.
12 Where f :T n → T is said to be monotonic if f (x1, . . . , xn) K f (y1, . . . , yn) whenever xi K yi , for
i = 1, . . . , n. [NB: this amounts to the same thing when K is replaced by I .]
13 In referring to the title of Avron’s evening lecture at the ESSLLI 2002, of which the WoPaLo was a part.
14 To pursue a previous footnote, adding an imaginary truth value i such that ¬i = i yields a solution to any
reflexive propositional equation f (x) = x, just as adding an imaginary number i such that i2 = −1 to the reals
supplies any reflexive polynomial equation f (x) = x with a solution.
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the deduction property for ‘t’, stating that it is precisely the translation of the consequence
relation at the object-language level:
Σ ∪ {ϕ} t ψ iff Σ t ϕ → ψ.
In fact, it can be shown that the {∧,∨,→,∀,∃}-fragment of L equipped with ‘t’ is ac-
tually identical to the corresponding fragment of the two-valued classical logic (see [7]).
That all the difference retires into the non-classical negation ‘¬’ is not a surprise. By the
way, it is worth noticing that ‘¬’ fails to satisfy the substitutivity property (in other words,
it is an intensional operator):
Φ t Ψ does not imply ¬Φ t ¬Ψ.15
Of course, this “intensionality” is nothing but the reflect at the object-language level of the
apparent and deliberate independence of the interpretations of ∈ and /∈ within any structure.
A substitutable external negation ‘∼’ can be obtained by setting ∼ϕ :≡ ϕ → 0. It is seen
from the table of ‘∼’ (below) that the unary connective ‘◦’ defined by ◦ϕ :≡ ∼(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)
is then precisely the indicator connective requested in Section 3.2.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, the consequence relation says nothing about the transmis-
sion of non-falsity. Consequently, ‘→’ is not self-contrapositive. To remedy this, we may
introduce another implication connective defined by:
ϕ ⇒ ψ :≡ (ϕ → ψ)∧ (¬ψ → ¬ϕ).
It has no longer the deduction property but does still satisfy modus ponens. Note that all
the conditionals defined so far share a common “classical” negation, i.e.:
f∈|ϕ ⊃ ψ |M iff f∈|ϕ → ψ |M iff f∈|ϕ ⇒ ψ |M iff t∈|ϕ|M
and f∈|ψ |M.
Here are the truth tables of the connectives we have introduced in this section:
∼
1 0
i 0
0 1
◦
1 1
i 0
0 1
→ 1 i 0
1 1 i 0
i 1 i 0
0 1 1 1
⇒ 1 i 0
1 1 0 0
i 1 i 0
0 1 1 1
⇔ 1 i 0
1 1 0 0
i 0 i 0
0 0 0 1
‘Non-monotonic connectives.’
It then can be confirmed that these are not monotonic. As a token of this fact, ob-
serve that ‘∼’ has no fixed values. The consequence is that the existence of the set
‘{x| ∼(x ∈ x)}’ is prohibited. Hence the presence of non-monotonic operators in formulae
defining sets can be devastating with regard to set theory.
By the way, a very characteristic property of ‘⇔’ is the following:
t∈|ϕ ⇔ ψ |M iff |ϕ|M = |ψ |M.
15 Here ‘Φ t Ψ ’ means ‘Φ t Ψ and Ψ t Φ’, or equivalently ‘tΦ ↔ Ψ ’.
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pressed at the object-language level now:
Comp[Σ] ≡ for any ϕ(x, y¯) in Σ ⊆ L,
∀ p¯ ∃y ∀x(x ∈ y ⇔ ϕ(x, p¯)).
Abst[Σ] ≡ for any ϕ(x, y¯) in Σ ⊆ L〈{· |−}〉,
∀ p¯ ∀x(x ∈{x|ϕ(x, p¯)} ⇔ ϕ(x, p¯)).
Remark 4. Note that by using an abstractor operator, the existential quantifier disappears
in the formulation of the abstraction scheme, so that this latter may equally be reformulated
by a “double two-ways rule”:{
x ∈ {x|ϕ(x, p¯)} t ϕ(x, p¯),
x /∈ {x|ϕ(x, p¯)} t ¬ϕ(x, p¯).
4. Equality and extensionality
Here it is shown that with the appropriate connectives in their formulations the classical
concepts of strict and extensional equalities can be so defined as to maintain their intuitive
meaning and classical properties.
4.1. The equality relation
In any set theory the role of the equality relation in the language, provided that it can be
used in formulae defining sets, is easily demonstrated. Indeed, to define such simple objects
as singletons might turn out to be ridiculously cumbersome, and certainly counter-intuitive,
if the equality was not available.
In order that the binary relational symbol ‘=’ deserves the equality status in the present
context, we require that its truth function on any structure M, i.e. =M :M ×M → T , be
defined in such a way that the following rules hold:{ t x = x (reflexivity)
{x = y,ϕ} t ϕ[x|y], for any formula ϕ16 (substitutivity).
Note that as soon as the negation can be used we have x = y t ϕ(x) ⇔ ϕ[x|y], which
means that in any structureM, |ϕ(a)|M= |ϕ[b|a]|M whenever t∈|a = b|M.
Remark 5. The reader should easily convince himself that actually the substitutivity prop-
erty forL-formulae17 can be met by only prescribing ‘=’ to satisfy x = y t x =◦ y∧x  y,
16 Where ϕ[x|y] is denoting the formula obtained from ϕ by substituting y for some, but not necessarily all,
free occurrences of x.
17 So in which ‘=’ does not occur.
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x =◦ y :≡ ∀z(z ∈ x ⇔ z ∈ y) and x  y :≡ ∀z(x ∈ z ⇔ y ∈ z).
To single out a particular class of structures that play a central role, let us now adopt the
next terminology:
Definition 6. We say that a structure M is normal if the equality relation is interpreted in
such a way that, for any a, b∈M , t∈|a = b|M iff a = b in M .18
It should be remarked that this does not completely determine the truth function of ‘=’
on M . All that is implied in the paraconsistent case is{
|a = b|M = 1 or i iff a = b in M,
|a = b|M = 0 iff a = b in M.
Thus, the same object could be interpreted within a normal structure as being both equal
to and different from itself. If it is the case that |a = a|M = 1 for any a in M , then ‘=M’
is called the classical identity on M .
4.2. About extensionality
The extensionality principle states that “two sets are equal as soon as it is shown that
they share the same members”. Accordingly, we shall say that a structure is extensional
when it obeys this principle. The relation of “sharing the same members” can be interpreted
in any structureM by “having the same extension(s)”, which is exactly expressed by ‘=◦ ’,
so this latter is often referred to as the extensional equality. The extensionality principle
does precisely assert that this latter is indeed an equality in the sense of Section 4.1. Now,
depending on whether the equality relation is admitted in the language, a structure M can
be said to be extensional in two ways essentially:
• If the use of ‘=’ is stipulated, the extensionality principle should appear as the rule
x =◦ y t x = y (and so we would have t x =◦ y ↔ x = y). Then we say that M is
extensional if M |= ∀x∀y(x =◦ y → x = y).• If the use of ‘=’ is proscribed, according to the remark in Section 4.1, ‘=◦ ’ could be
considered as an equality provided that the rule x =◦ y t x  y holds. Then we say
thatM is weakly extensional if M |= ∀x∀y(x =◦ y → x  y).
Remark 7. If for any a∈M , there is a˘ ∈ M with M |= ∀x(x ∈ a˘ ⇔ a ∈ x), i.e. a˘ =
‘{x|a ∈ x}’, then it is easily proved that M |= ∀x∀y(x  y ⇒ x =◦ y). This should be
the case in any model for some version of naive set theory, showing that ‘=◦ ’ and ‘’ are
intimately related to each other, independently of extensionality.
18 This latter equality symbol is the meta-theoretic identity; explicitly, ‘a = b in M’ means that ‘a’ and ‘b’ are
designating the same object in M .
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that any weakly extensional structure M gives rise to an extensional one by defining =M
on M by |x = y|M := |x =◦ y|M. To see this, one has to prove that this interpretation of
‘=’ fulfills reflexivity and substitutivity in Section 4.1.
Hint. Remark that x =◦ y t δ(x, y), where this latter is the L-formula defined by
δ(x, y) :≡ ∃z((z ∈ x ∧ z /∈ y)∨ (z /∈ x ∧ z ∈ y)).
As in any case the extensionality principle asserts that x = y t x =◦ y, it is interesting
to note that within an extensional universe, by allowing ‘=’ in formulae defining sets, some
non-monotonic functions may sneak into them by the back door.19 This is going to have to
be explained in the last sections.
Finally, it should be recalled that, previously in Section 2.1, a structure M was said to
be strongly extensional if for any a, b in M ,M |= a =◦ b implies a = b in M .19 In fact this
now coincides with the notion of extensional normal structure, i.e.:
strongly extensional ≡ extensional + normal.
It is worth noting that in any extensional normal structure M, for any distinct objects a, b
in M , as t/∈|a = b|M, we must have t/∈|a =◦ b|M, and so f∈|a =◦ b|M. Therefore, if more-
over, for any a in M such that f∈|a = a|M, it was the case that f∈|a =◦ a|M as well, then
we would have that M |= ∀x∀y(x =◦ y ⇒ x = y). Such a strongly extensional structure is
said to be perfect. The models which are described in Section 5 fulfill this stronger axiom of
extensionality, considering that ‘=’ will be so defined as to satisfy x = y t δ(x, y) (with
δ(x, y) as above). Consequently, within such models the contradictory sets are exactly
those that are different from themselves, namely x = x ≡ δ(x, x) ≡ “x is contradictory”.
5. Kripke-style models: a tribute to monotonicity
Historically, the first “successful” attempts of building a universe of sets which is gov-
erned by some kind of full comprehension scheme in a non-classical logic were based on
a term model construction (e.g., [9,20]). Roughly, the universe M of such a model is sim-
ply made of set abstracts, seen as syntactical expressions of the form {x|ϕ(x)}, say for
suitable formulae ϕ, and then, by a fixed-point argument, the membership relation on M is
determined in such a way that finally {x|ϕ(x)} be a solution to the corresponding instance
of what is now called the abstraction scheme.
Basically, that technique initiated by Gilmore in [19], and then resumed by Brady in
[9], both for the paracomplete case, can be considered as the counterpart of the seminal
but later work by Kripke on the liar paradox. This parallel has already been noticed and
largely investigated by Feferman in [16]. For a comprehensive treatment concerning the
liar paradox only, the reader is referred to Visser’s paper [30].
19 More precisely, by means of the ‘⇔’ involved in the definition of ‘=’.◦
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attempts, namely the incompatibility of extensionality and abstraction with equality in the
language.
5.1. A fixed-point theorem
We start with showing how/why a fixed-point argument comes into the picture.
Let f (p) be any propositional function in one propositional variable p, and let τ :=
‘{x|f (x ∈ x)}’. If the existence of τ was guaranteed in a structure M, we would have
|τ ∈ τ |M = |f (τ ∈ τ)|M = |f |(|τ ∈ τ |M), where |f | is denoting the truth function of f ,
showing that this latter should have a fixed-point. Thus, roughly, sets defined by means
of truth functions having fixed-points are most welcome. As furtively mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.2, monotonic truth functions on V/Λ are such ones; in that sense monotonicity is a
safety property.
In order-theoretic terms, stating that any monotonic function on V/Λ has a fixed-point
amounts to saying that V is a dcpo:
Definition 8. We say that a partially ordered set D is directed complete, or in brief is a
dcpo, if any directed subset in D has a least upper bound; where A ⊆ D is said to be
directed if for any a, b∈A, there exists c∈A with a, b D c. [Note that ∅ is directed, so
that D must have a least element (provided D = ∅).]
The relevance of this notion lies in the following important result:
Theorem 9 (Knaster–Tarski). Let D be a dcpo and f :D → D be monotonic. Then f has
a fixed point, i.e. there exists x in D such f (x) = x. Moreover, if Fix(f ) denotes the set of
its fixed points, then Fix(f ) is also a dcpo.
Using the machinery of ordinal numbers, the least fixed point can be reached inductively
by iterating f from the least element of D, while the existence of maximal ones relies on
Zorn’s lemma (unless D is finite, of course).
The original version of this statement due to Tarski was rather concerned with complete
lattices. This one involving dcpo’s is actually the best possible refinement in view of the
following result (due to Markowski), of which the proof is by far much harder:
If D is an ordered set with a least element such that any monotonic f :D → D
has a fixed point, then D is a dcpo.
The Knaster–Tarski fixed-point theorem, as many other fixed-point theorems actually,
has shown itself to be a tremendous tool in many areas for solving so-called reflexive
equations ‘X F(X)’. In a sense, any universe of sets might be conceived as a solution to
such a reflexive equation.
The framework of dcpo’s rather suggests considering T with the knowledge ordering
K , even in the paraconsistent case, seeing that Λ is not properly speaking a dcpo. As
anyway V and Λ have the same class of monotonic functions, as long as only monotonic
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yield a corresponding result for the paraconsistent one and vice versa. The introduction of
non-monotonic operators (as the equality relation) may introduce a certain asymmetry in
the duality. The attitude that consists in considering T with the knowledge ordering when
i = {t,f} can be summarized by the following slogan:
“a clash of information ≡ a lack of knowledge”.
It is time now to proceed to some applications of this fixed-point theorem in connection
with set theory.
5.2. A denotational universe
Let Σ be any given fragment of L〈{· |−}〉 defined by means of monotonic connectives
and quantifiers in such a way that Σ be closed for substitutions, i.e. whenever ϕ(x¯) is in
Σ and τ¯ are Σ -terms, that are variables, Σ -constants or set abstracts {x|ψ} where ψ is in
Σ , then ϕ(τ¯ ) is also in Σ . In fact, this assumption guarantees that the abstraction operator
is naturally interpretable on the set of all closed Σ -terms, which is denoted here by M : the
interpretation of ‘{x|ϕ(x, y¯)}’, for y¯ := τ¯ in M , being nothing but {x|ϕ(x, τ¯ )}.
We are going to show that among all the structures having M as universe there do exist
such ones fulfilling Abst[Σ]. Since the universe is predetermined, we may identify any
structure M with its membership truth function εM∈VM×M . Now the “approximating”
function (·)+ :VM×M → VM×M is defined by:
|a ∈ b|(M)+ :=
∣∣ϕ(x|a)∣∣M for any a, b in M with b = {x|ϕ(x)}.
It is clear that the models of Abst[Σ] are thus exactly the fixed points of (·)+. It then re-
mains to show that such fixed points exist. To do that, observe that VM×M is itself naturally
equipped with a knowledge/information ordering, defined by M1 K M2 :iff for all x, y
in M , εM1(x, y) K εM2(x, y). Clearly this ordering turns VM×M into a dcpo as well.
Now, as long as only monotonic connectives and quantifiers are involved in Σ , it can read-
ily be proved that the approximating function (·)+ is monotonic on VM×M . Therefore the
existence of models of Abst[Σ] is established by the fixed-point theorem in Section 5.1.
It is apparent from the meaning of K on VM×M that the most interesting models
should be the maximal ones, namely those in which there is a minimum of undeter-
mined/contradictory “memberships”. As a general rule, these models fail to obey the
extensionality principle.
With regard to extensionality, a much more problematic aspect on which we shall now
elaborate is the use of the equality relation in formulae defining sets.
Note that it is actually possible to incorporate the equality relation, by defining =M in
any structure M to be the classical identity on M , namely:
|a = b|M :=
{
1 if a and b are syntactically equal,
0 otherwise.
Now, by setting |a = b|(M)+ := |a = b|M, the function (·)+ remains monotonic, and then
the consistency of an abstraction scheme with equality in formulae defining sets follows:
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This result emerges from Gilmore’s work on partial set theory (see [19,20]). The origi-
nal proof makes use of partial predicates and it is based on the so-called inductive method,
later popularized by Kripke, so that the model considered is actually the minimal one. It
is not extensional, seeing that the syntactical interpretation of the equality is by no means
suitable for the intended meaning of the elements of M , as for instance it leads to differ-
entiate {x|0 ∧ 0} from {x|0}, whereas these are clearly extensionally equal. Accordingly,
there would not be any extensional structure.
One might be tempted to remedy the situation by adopting a more suitable definition
of the equality in the model itself. That is probably why, in a first report on his result (see
[19]), Gilmore suggested that his model might be extensional. He however had to disprove
it later in his paper [20]. Indeed, it is hopeless to combine extensionality and abstraction
with the equality relation in formulae defining sets. To stress once more the asymmetry
(due here to the presence of the equality), it should be noted that the original proof of this
result, further explored and slightly simplified by Hinnion in [21], does not apply directly
to the paraconsistent case. In fact, and curiously enough, it is less sophisticated for this
latter:
Theorem 11. There is no extensional paraconsistent model of Abst[L〈∈,=, {· |−};0〉].
Proof. Set a(x) := {u | x ∈ x} and τ := {x | a(x) = ∅}, where ∅ := {u | 0}.
Now let M be any paraconsistent model of Abst[L〈∈,=, {· |−};0〉].
We show thatM |= a(τ) =◦ ∅, whileM |= a(τ) = ∅.
To show that M |= a(τ) =◦ ∅, suppose t∈|u ∈ a(τ)|M. Hence t∈|τ ∈ τ |M, and thus
t∈|a(τ) = ∅|M. Then, by substitutivity, we would have t∈|u ∈ ∅|M, which is impossible.
Hence, for any u, |u ∈ a(τ)|M = 0 = |u ∈ ∅|M, as desired.
On the other hand, we must have |a(τ) = ∅|M = 0; for if t∈|a(τ) = ∅|M, we would
have t∈|τ ∈ τ |M, by definition of τ , and so, for any u, t∈ |u ∈ a(τ)|M, which is impossi-
ble as we have just seen. 
This observation is all the more interesting since Brady in [9] proved a complementary
result of Gilmore’s, even though he was not aware of that, namely that one can recover
extensionality if (and only if) one drops equality out of the language:20
Theorem 12 (Brady). Abst[L〈∈, {· |−};0,¬,∧,∀〉] is consistent with extensionality.
Brady’s ingenious proof consists in showing that the minimal model is weakly exten-
sional (see [9] for the paracomplete case and [12] for the paraconsistent one). It is actually
based on the fact that the minimal fixed point of a monotonic function on a dcpo can
be reached inductively, so that extensionality can indeed be considered as a characteristic
20 It should be remarked that Brady in [9] (submitted in 1969) could not have been aware of a result of Gilmore’s
[20] published in 1974, but even in subsequent works [10–12] this fact does not seem to have been noticed.
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of extensionality is not monotonic since the non-monotonic connective ‘→’ is involved in
its formulation. To testify to this fact, it is fairly easy to exhibit maximal fixed point models
which are not extensional:
Proof. Set τ := {x | x ∈ x} and τ ′ := {x | x ∈ x ∧ x ∈ x}. It is clear that, for any M,
M |= τ =◦ τ ′. It is easy to see as well that if M0 is the minimal model, then we must have|τ ∈ τ |M0 = i = |τ ′ ∈ τ ′|M0 .
We now define a new structureM1 as follows:{
|τ ∈ τ |M1 = 0 and |τ ′ ∈ τ ′|M1 = 1,
|a ∈ b|M1 = |a ∈ b|M0 otherwise.
Fact. M1 K M+1 .
To see this, first observe that |τ ∈ τ |(M1)+ = |τ ∈ τ |M1 = 0 and that |τ ′ ∈ τ ′|(M1)+ =|τ ′ ∈ τ ′ ∧ τ ′ ∈ τ ′|M1 = |τ ′ ∈ τ ′|M1 ∧ |τ ′ ∈ τ ′|M1 = 1.
Now, let a and b = {x | ϕ(x)} in M with a and b not both equal to τ or τ ′. Then, |a ∈
b|M1 = |a ∈ b|M0 = |ϕ(x|a)|M0 K |ϕ(x|a)|M1 = |a ∈ b|(M1)+ , seeing that M0 <KM1 and that ϕ is supposed to be monotonic.
Note that if M∗1 was any maximal (·)+-fixed point above M1, we would have |τ ∈
τ |M∗1 = 0 and |τ ′ ∈ τ |M∗1 = |τ ′ ∈ τ ′|M∗1 = 1, and so M∗1 |= τ  τ ′. Thus M∗1 could not
be extensional. [Note that this already happens in the least fixed-point aboveM1.]
To show that such a maximal fixed pointM∗1 does exist is routine:
Let D1 := {M |M1 K M} and (·)+1 be the restriction of (·)+ to D1. We first observe
that (·)+1 is monotonic on D1. Indeed, ifM1 K M, then we haveM1 K M+1 K M+
(using the fact), and this latter belongs to D1 as well. Therefore, as D1 is a dcpo, so is
Fix[(·)+1 ], and any maximal element suits. 
Remark 13. The inductive method was further investigated by Brady, in [10] for the
paraconsistent case and in [11] for the paracomplete one. Roughly, by subtly defining a
non-truth-functional conditional ‘’, he succeeded in proving the consistency of a full
abstraction scheme together with a corresponding weak form of extensionality, namely:
Abst′ :≡ for any ϕ(x, y¯) in L〈∈, {· |−};0,¬,∧,∀,〉,
∀ p¯ ∀x(x ∈{x|ϕ(x, p¯)} ϕ(x, p¯)),
Ext′ :≡ ∣∣∀x∀y (∀z(z ∈ x z ∈ y) → ∀z(x ∈ z y ∈ z)).
In the paracomplete case, it is shown in [11] that the underlying logic is close to the infinite-
valued Łukiasiewicz logic, for which besides it was proved that the full abstraction scheme
(without equality in the language either) is consistent. Come to this, it is worth mentioning
that a similar technique to Brady’s has very recently been applied to the liar paradox by
Field in [15].21
21 It would seem that Brady has himself applied his technique to the Liar in his book Universal Logic, CSLI
publs, forthcoming (2003).
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In view of the results described above, it is rather apparent that such denotational uni-
verses cannot be considered as “natural models” for some set theory. Actually, the above
considerations raise the following question: by dropping set abstracts out of the language
but keeping equality, can we get a theory with extensional models? In other words,
is Comp[L〈∈,=;0,¬,∧,∀〉] consistent with extensionality?
Yes, we can give a positive answer to this question for the paraconsistent case. The models
we are going to present were first introduced and manufactured in a different way in [22],
and then further studied in [24]. It seems quite clear that the construction of such models
should involve other techniques. The remainder of this paper is devoted to showing how
one could have got these in a natural way.
It has already been argued by some authors (e.g., [16]) that the sole use of monotonic
connectives and quantifiers in formulae defining sets is not sufficient to be able to develop
classical mathematics from a set theoretical point of view. To contrast with this, it should be
said the models we propose actually fulfill an extended comprehension scheme involving
some non-monotonic functions (due to the presence of ‘=’) and then it turns out that the
natural paraconsistent set theory to which the properties of these models give rise can
interpret ZF.
6. Scott-style models: beyond monotonicity
The second technique of building models which is tackled here has its source in Scott’s
work on models for the untyped lambda calculus. Roughly, it was there the discovery that
the fixed-point theorem stated in the previous section is actually reflected within suitable
subcategories of the corresponding objects, namely the dcpo’s, with the appropriate mor-
phisms, the so-called Scott-continuous functions, which are specific monotonic functions
having a computational meaning. Indeed, it has been proved there is a wide variety of
functors ‘F(·)’ which do have fixed points within those categories, such fixed points being
obtained by projective limits. Since then, this technique has proved to be very useful in
theoretical computer science for producing semantics of programming languages.22
6.1. The limit of monotonicity
For our purposes it might therefore be tempting to solve a reflexive domain equation of
the form X  F(X) where F(X) ⊆ 〈X → V 〉, the set of all monotonic functions from X
into V , for it is rather clear that such a fixed point could give rise to a strongly extensional
model of Comp[L〈· · · ;0,¬,∧,∀〉].
Such an attempt for the paracomplete case is taken very seriously in [5], where it is
finally shown that the structure so constructed contains a model of “rough set theory”
22 We again rely on appropriate references and leave the interested reader to consult the abundant literature on
the subject, as [2] for instance.
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our question, at least as far as monotonicity alone is concerned. To see this, we first have
to point out a significant difference between this technique and the one described in the
previous section: such a fixed-point model M  F(M) would be obtained by projective
limit within a subcategory of dcpo’s, so that the universe M of the final structure, which
is not fixed in advance here, carries its own knowledge/information ordering M that turns
it into a dcpo. Now, whatever the way εM is actually defined on M , the existence of
the sets ‘{x|x ∈ x}’, ‘{x|x ∈ a}’ and ‘{x|a ∈ x}’, for any a in M , immediately compels
the function x → εM(x, x) and, for any a in M , the functions x → εM(x, a) and x →
εM(a, x), to belong to F(M) ⊆ 〈M → V 〉. Accordingly, εM :M × M → V should be
monotonic in both of its arguments with respect toM . Of course, the same remark applies
to =M :M ×M → V .
So, in order to be able to incorporate the equality relation in formulae defining sets, this
latter should be monotonic. This is unfortunately not the case on a normal model, for as
soon as there exist two objects a, b∈M with a <M b, we would have t/∈|a = b|M whereas
t∈|a = a|M.
We shall thus abandon the category of dcpo’s for another one in which the identity is
welcomed. It has often been shown in mathematics that a problem (an equation in partic-
ular) can be solved by enlarging the realm of its potential solutions. What we are going to
do hereafter is another illustration of this.
6.2. From monotonicity to continuity
It is well known that monotonicity is a particular case of continuity. Indeed, if any
ordered set is equipped with the topology of which the closed subsets are simply the
downwards-closed subsets, i.e. A is closed iff x  a∈A implies x∈A, then the monotonic
maps become precisely the continuous ones.
Applying this to V ≡ 〈T ;K 〉, it is easy to see that
f :X → V is continuous iff f−1{0, i} and f−1{1, i} are both closed.
Now we would remind the reader that such a function f defines a paraconsistent set x for
which precisely [x]+X = f−1{1, i} and [x]−X = f−1{0, i}. So the next step is naturally to
look at paraconsistent sets defined in terms of closed subsets which cover the universe, but
closed in a broader topological sense, not only in connection with any given ordering. This
leads to swap the set of monotonic functions for the set of all continuous functions from a
topological space X into V , which then becomes identified with:
F(X) := {(A,B) | A,B closed in X and A∪B = X}⊆Pp(X).
As we shall see, a solution to X F(X) will come up to our expectations. To solve this re-
flexive equation, we shall work within a suitable category of Hausdorff topological spaces.
This is a singular departure from the preceding attempts because the topology of an ordered
set is not Hausdorff (unless the ordering is totally disconnected). Now, in spite of the fact
that the equality =M :M ×M → V is not monotonic on a normal model M, we will see
that it can however be continuous, but then =−1M {1, i} = {(a, a) | a∈M} should be closed,
which exactly means that M should be Hausdorff! So we are on the right track.
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In the light of Section 6.2, the fixed-point theorem in Section 5.1 simply states that
particular continuous functions, namely monotonic ones, do have fixed points. Now there
are other well-known fixed-point theorems involving continuous maps.
One of the most famous (and much harder to prove by far) is Brouwer’s, stating that
any real continuous function on the cube [0,1]n (n  1) has a fixed point. Interestingly,
this theorem was invoked in the first attempts of building a model for naive set theory in
the infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic.23
Another famous fixed-point theorem is Banach’s for complete metric spaces:
Definition 14. Let 〈X1, d1〉, 〈X2, d2〉 be metric spaces. We say that f :X1 → X2 is con-
tracting if there exists ε < 1 such that d2(f (x), f (y)) ε · d1(x, y), for any x, y in M .
Theorem 15 (Banach). Let 〈X,d〉 be a complete metric space and f :X → X a contracting
function. Then f has a unique fixed point, i.e. there is a unique x in X such that f (x) = x.
Just as for dcpo’s, it has been shown that this fixed-point theorem is reflected within cer-
tain categories of corresponding objects, the complete metric spaces. Indeed, it is proved
in [4] that there is a large class of functors, called “contracting”, that do have fixed points
within such a suitable category. It is then not surprising that the framework of complete
metric spaces too has shown itself to be a useful tool for producing semantics of program-
ming languages.
6.4. Working with compact complete metric spaces
Roughly, using the techniques described in [4], a solution to our reflexive equation X 
F(X) can be found. What we get then is a compact metric space M together with an
homeomorphism h from M onto F(M). As we shall see, compactness is going to be an
essential ingredient in order to show that such a structure gives rise to a model for some
paraconsistent set theory. Of course it is beyond the scope of this paper to describe the
construction of that structure. It will not be necessary anyway. As previously mentioned,
such a solution is already presented and manufactured in a different way in [22]. Moreover,
it should be remarked that the results of [4] cannot be applied directly to our case. Some
technical and precautionary checking is actually required. Particularly, it must be shown
that, for any complete metric space X, F(X) admits a complete metric space structure as
well. Here we shall content ourselves with proving this, introducing some notations and a
preparatory result.
We first recall that, for any metric space 〈X,d〉, the set of its closed subsets, denoted by
Pcl(X), is naturally equipped with a metric, the so-called Hausdorff distance dH which is
defined as follows:
23 The use of fixed-point theorems in connection with semantics for naive set theory in many-valued logics is
detailed in [25].
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d∗(x,Y ) := inf
y∈Y
{
d(x, y)
}
and then, for any A,B∈ Pcl(X), define
dH (A,B) := max
{
sup
a∈A
{d∗(a,B)}, sup
b∈B
{d∗(b,A)}
}
.
In this way, it is proved that whenever 〈X,d〉 is complete, so is 〈Pcl(X), dH 〉.24 Now
〈Pcl(X)×Pcl(X), dmax〉 is also a complete metric space with
dmax
(
(A1,B1), (A2,B2)
) := max{dH (A1,A2), dH (B1,B2)}.
Thus, seeing that F(X) ⊂ Pcl(X) × Pcl(X), it will be a complete metric space provided
we show that F(X) is closed:
Proof. Let (Ak,Bk) −→
k→∞(A,B), with (Ak,Bk)
∈ F(X) for all k∈N.
Suppose there exists x0∈X with x0 /∈A∪B . Then we would have both d∗(x0,A)  ε and
d∗(x0,B) ε, for some ε > 0. Now, since Ak −→
k→∞A and Bk −→k→∞B , one could also find
n∈N, such that both dH (An,A) < ε and dH (Bn,B) < ε, and it would follow therefrom
that x0 /∈An ∪Bn, which is impossible. Whence A∪B = X, and thus (A,B)∈ F(X). 
Remark 16. It should be noted that this result is very characteristic of the paraconsis-
tent interpretation. For instance, the “pseudo-dual” operator F∗(·) defined by F∗(X) :=
{(A,B) | A,B closed in X and A ∩ B = ∅} may no longer yield a complete metric space.
Indeed, take X := [−1,1] with (Ak,Bk) := ([−1,− 1k ], [ 1k ,1]), for each k  1. Then
(Ak,Bk) −→
k→∞([−1,0], [0,1])/∈F
∗(X). Anyhow, it is apparent from Section 6.2 that a
paracomplete set should rather be considered as an ordered pair of disjoint open subsets,
not closed.
On the way, we conclude this section by proving a short preparatory result:
Lemma 17. Let f :X → Pcl(X) be continuous. Then {(x, y)∈X2 | x∈f (y)}∈ Pcl(X2).
Proof. Set F = {(x, y)∈X2 | x∈f (y)} and suppose (xk, yk) −→
k→∞(x, y) with (xk, yk)
∈F
for all k∈N. Then, since f is continuous, f (yk) −→
k→∞f (y). Hence, for any ε > 0, there
does exist n such that both d(xn, x) < ε2 and dH (f (yn), f (y)) <
ε
2 . As xn∈f (yn), this
implies d∗(xn, f (y)) < ε2 and then one can find z∈f (y) with d(xn, z) <
ε
2 . Thus we have
d(x, z) d(x, xn)+ d(xn, z) < ε, showing that x∈f (y) = f (y), and so (x, y)∈F . 
24 See for instance Engelking’s book: General Topology, Polish Scientific, Warsaw, 1977.
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It is remarkable that actually we do not even need to know the internal structure of M
to define our model. Indeed, all we need is a compact metric space M together with an
homeomorphism h (not necessarily an isometry) onto F(M):
M
h
F(M).
We begin with specifying the interpretation of the primitive symbols in M :
[·]M := h, i.e.: for any a, b in M,
{
t∈|a ∈ b|M :iff a∈ (pr1 ◦ h)(b),
f∈|a ∈ b|M :iff a∈ (pr2 ◦ h)(b)(25).
As h is 1–1, this defines a strongly extensional structure (in the sense of Section 2.1). In
consequence, we may define the interpretation of ‘=’ as follows:
for any a, b in M,
{
t∈|a = b|M :iff a = b in M,
f∈|a = b|M :iff t∈|δ(a, b)|M.
Thus we get an extensional normal structure that is perfect (as defined in Section 4.2).
We now move on to the analogue of monotonicity in this context:
Definition 18. We define the positive and negative extensions of a LM 〈∈,=〉-formula
ϕ(u¯(n)), with u¯ = u1, . . . , un and n 1, respectively as follows:{
〈ϕ(u¯)〉+M := {(a¯)∈Mn | t∈|ϕ(u¯|a¯)|M},
〈ϕ(u¯)〉−M := {(a¯)∈Mn | f∈|ϕ(u¯|a¯)|M}.
Then we say that such a formula ϕ(u¯(n)) is continuous if its positive and negative exten-
sions thus defined are closed subsets of Mn.
It is worth observing that this actually does not depend on the choice of the free variables
in ϕ, for it can be seen that ϕ(u¯(n)) is continuous iff ϕ(v¯(m)) is,26 as well as if ϕ(u¯(k), v¯(l))
is continuous and (a¯)∈Ml , then so is ϕ(v¯|a¯)(u¯(k)).
Following the rules defining the truth functions of the monotonic connectives and quan-
tifiers, it is readily shown that:〈
(¬ϕ)(u¯)〉+M = 〈ϕ(u¯)〉−M,〈
(¬ϕ)(u¯)〉−M = 〈ϕ(u¯)〉+M;〈
(ϕ ∧ψ)(u¯)〉+M = 〈ϕ(u¯)〉+M ∩ 〈ψ(u¯)〉+M,〈
(ϕ ∧ψ)(u¯)〉−M = 〈ϕ(u¯)〉−M ∪ 〈ψ(u¯)〉−M;
25 pr1, pr2 denote respectively the projections on the first and on the second component.
26 We would remind the reader that by writing ϕ(u¯(n)) and ϕ(v¯(m)) the actual free variables of ϕ are supposed
to be among u¯ = u1, . . . , un and v¯ = v1, . . . , vm.
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(∀xϕ)(u¯)〉+M = ⋂
a∈M
〈
ϕ(x|a)(u¯)〉+M,〈
(∀xϕ)(u¯)〉−M = pr2〈ϕ(x, u¯)〉−M.
In this latter we are rather considering 〈ϕ(x, u¯(n))〉−M as a subset of M × Mn, so that pr2
has to be understood as the projection on the second component Mn. Incidentally, we could
have written〈
(∀xϕ)(u¯)〉−M = ⋃
a∈M
〈
ϕ(x|a)(u¯)〉−M
but this would not have enabled us to prove the next lemma:
Lemma 19. Any ϕ(u¯(n))∈LM 〈∈,=;0,¬,∧,∀〉 is continuous and 〈ϕ(u¯)〉+M ∪ 〈ϕ(u¯)〉−M =
Mn.
Proof. The topological ingredients of the proof can be summarized by two facts:
(1) A space X is Hausdorff iff 
X := {(a, a) | a∈M} is closed in X2;
(2) If X1,X2 are compact and Hausdorff spaces, then the projection maps pri :X1×X2 →
Xi (i = 1,2) are closed, i.e. for any closed subset F ⊆ X1 × X2, pri(F ) is closed in
Xi (i = 1,2).
From the rules described above, it is clear that the continuity of a formula is preserved
under the logical operators ‘¬’ and ‘∧’; because of the compactness of M , the preservation
under ‘∀’ is now guaranteed by (2). Thus, it suffices to show that the atomic formulae
are continuous. Using (1), (2) and the lemma in Section 6.4, this easily follows from the
following observations:
〈0〉+M = ∅
∣∣ 〈0〉−M = M
〈x ∈ y〉+M =
{
(x, y) | x∈ (pr1 ◦ h)(y)
} ∣∣ 〈x ∈ y〉−M = {(x, y) | x∈ (pr2 ◦ h)(y)}
〈x ∈ x〉+M = pr1
(〈x ∈ y〉+M ∩
M) ∣∣ 〈x ∈ x〉−M = pr1(〈x ∈ y〉−M ∩
M)
〈x = y〉+M = 
M
∣∣ 〈x = y〉−M = 〈δ(x, y)〉+M
〈x = x〉+M = M
∣∣ 〈x = x〉−M = pr1(〈x = y〉−M ∩
M)
[Recalling that δ(x, y) :≡ ∃z((z ∈ x ∧ z /∈ y) ∨ (z /∈ x ∧ z ∈ y)) (see Section 4.2).] The
second assertion of the lemma is easily proved by induction on the complexity of a formula
as well, seeing that it does hold for atomic formulae. 
Now we are ready to prove the expected result:
Theorem 20. M |= Comp[L〈∈,=;0,¬,∧,∀〉].
Proof. Let ϕ(x)∈LM 〈∈,=;0,¬,∧,∀〉. By the preceding lemma, (〈ϕ(x)〉+M, 〈ϕ(x)〉−M) is
a covering pair of closed subsets of M . Therefore, by the surjectivity of h, there does exist
b in M such that [b]+ = 〈ϕ(x)〉+ and [b]− = 〈ϕ(x)〉− . M M M M
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tensional universe. According to Section 4.2, some non-monotonic functions should come
along with it. In the model, this is certified by the next lemma that states that, beside the
equality relation, other non-monotonic functions are allowed in formulae defining sets by
means of restricted quantifications:
Lemma 21. If ϕ is continuous, so are ‘∀x(x ∈ y → ϕ)’ and ‘∀x(x /∈ y → ϕ)’.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ(x, y, z¯) is continuous and let ψ(y, z¯) :≡ ∀x(x ∈ y → ϕ(x, y, z¯)).
One the one hand, it must be shown that F := 〈ψ(y, z¯)〉+M is closed.
So, let (yk, z¯k) −→
k→∞(b, c¯) with (yk, z¯k)
∈F , for any k∈N.
Suppose t∈|a ∈ b|M, for some a ∈ M . We have to show that t∈|ϕ(a, b, c¯)|M.
As (pr1 ◦ h)(·) = [·]+M is continuous, we have dH ([yk]+M), [b]+M) −→k→∞ 0.
Now, as a∈ [b]+M, this implies d∗(a, [yk]+M) −→k→∞ 0. Therefore, for any n∈N0, one can
find xkn∈ [ykn ]+M such that d(a, xkn) < 1/n (and such that kn < kn+1). Thus, as t∈ |xkn ∈
ykn |M and (ykn, z¯kn)∈F , we have t∈|ϕ(xkn, ykn, z¯kn)|M, for any n∈N0. Now, since
(xkn, ykn, z¯kn) −→
k→∞(a, b, c¯) and ϕ is continuous, it follows that t
∈|ϕ(a, b, c¯)|M, as ex-
pected. Hence 〈ψ(y, z¯)〉+M is closed.
On the other hand, 〈ψ(y, z¯)〉−M = pr2(〈x ∈ y〉+M ∩ 〈ϕ(x, y, z¯)〉−M) is clearly closed.
We thus have proved that ψ(y, z¯) is continuous.
The proof is similar for ψ ′(y, z¯) :≡ ∀x(x /∈ y → ϕ(x, y, z¯)). 
We shall now review succinctly some properties of the model which show why such
models can be considered as natural models for a paraconsistent set theory.
Let us first adopt the following abbreviation: ‘x  y’ :≡ ‘∀z(z ∈ x ⇒ z ∈ y)’.
It is easily observed thatM |= a  b iff [a]+M ⊆ [b]+M and [b]−M ⊆ [a]−M, and so:
M |= a = b iff M |= a  b ∧ b  a.
According to the last lemma, ‘’ can be used in formulae defining sets, so that the existence
of a relevant power-set operation, namely P(y) := ‘{x|x  y}’, is actually derivable from
the extended comprehension scheme the model fulfills.
From the algebraic point of view, let us mention that the universe of the model is a
typical example of what is called a paraconsistent boolean algebra in [13]. Incidentally,
the underlying order of this algebra is nothing but ‘’ above. Note also that the subalgebra
of classical sets is exactly (up to isomorphism) the (classical) boolean algebra of clopen
subsets in M .
A very characteristic property of the model comes directly from its definition and can
be expressed as follows:
Definition 22. For any a, b∈M , a is said to be less contradictory than b, denoted by a  b,
whenever [a]+M ⊆ [b]+M and [a]−M ⊆ [b]−M. [Note that in the three-valued setting, this
amounts to saying that [a]M I [b]M, namely [a]M(x)I [b]M(x), for all x∈M , defin-
ing the information/knowledge ordering at the set level.]
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Indeed, it is nothing but the (unique) x0 such that [x0]M = (A,B).
As an immediate consequence, any collection definable by a L-formula ϕ(x) is opti-
mally approximated by a -minimal set x0 defined by:
[x0]M =
(〈ϕ(x)〉+M, 〈ϕ(x)〉−M ).
The natural paraconsistent first-order theory to which all these properties give rise is ax-
iomatized in [24]. There it was conjectured that, with a relevant formulation of an axiom
of infinity, that theory could interpret ZF. Very recently, Esser [14] has proved the exis-
tence of models fulfilling such a relevant axiom of infinity. These are obtained from strong
models of positive set theory called hyperuniverses and described in [18].
As a concluding remark, it should be mentioned that the dual structure M∗ (as defined
in Section 2.1) is not a solution to the corresponding paracomplete problem. AlthoughM∗
is a strongly extensional paracomplete model of Comp[L〈∈;0,¬,∧,∀〉], it can be shown
that the “full” equality relation in formulae defining sets is still missing; actually, equality
between classical sets only is allowed. This should be discussed elsewhere.
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